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Abstract In Lettres philosophiques, Letter XIII is devoted to Locke, as are Letters
XIV–XVII to Newton. The ordering of these letters is not adequately explained by
comparing the dates of birth or death of the two thinkers. For the Letter on Locke
not only precedes but also ‘frames’ those on Newton, in the sense that it provides
the reader with a guide through the philosophical intricacies of Letters XIV–XVII.
This works in two ways. On the one hand, in order to defend Newton against his
detractors Voltaire broadly adopts Locke’s perspective on the relation among words,
ideas and things. On the other hand, he subtly and misleadingly grafts Locke’s
epistemology onto the Principia, though it differs from Newton’s epistemology in
significant respects. For Locke, unlike Newton, holds that we can identify fixed,
permanent limits concerning what kind of thing humanity can know of matter and
the universe. Voltaire presents Newton’s ideas as though they respected Locke’s
limits. However, we can glimpse Voltaire’s own attitude in the final words of Letter
XV: ‘Procedes huc, et non ibis amplius’: Voltaire agrees more closely with Locke
than Newton concerning the limits of epistemology.
Keywords Voltaire  Lettres philosophiques  Locke  Newton  Epistemology 
Natural philosophy
Introduction
Within Lettres philosophiques (1734) a central series of Letters (XII–XVII) is
devoted to three famous English thinkers, referred to by a modern commentator
as ‘the […] triumvirate of novatores: Bacon, Newton, Locke’ (Tornelli 1971:
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221).1 In Letter XII, on Bacon, Voltaire grants the author of the Novum
Organum the title ‘pe`re de la philosophie expe´rimentale’ (Voltaire 1961: 34), but
worries about his superstitious tendencies (1961: 36). Nevertheless, he notes
admiringly that Bacon had postulated ‘cette attraction nouvelle dont M. Newton
passe pour l’inventeur’. Voltaire cites Bacon as follows: ‘Il faut chercher, dit
Bacon, s’il n’y aurait point une espe`ce de force magne´tique qui ope`re entre la
terre et les choses pesantes, entre la lune et l’oce´an, entre les plane`tes, etc.’
(1961: 35–36). This plants a seed in the reader’s mind: experimental philosophy
(associated with scientific progress) leads to the discovery of attraction. But it is
above all in Letter XIII, ‘Sur M. Locke’, that Voltaire predisposes the reader to
accept Newton’s discovery. He does so in two particularly important ways. First,
he uses Locke’s views on words, ideas and things to buttress the case he makes
for Newtonian as opposed to Cartesian physics. Second, he attributes to Newton
a key aspect of Locke’s epistemology: the assertion that there exist insuperable
limits to what natural philosophers can ever discover concerning the universe.
This second use of Locke, however, is tendentious, indeed misleading; for (as we
will see below) Newton does not agree with Locke concerning the existence of
such limits. In brief, when we attend closely to the relevant passages of Lettres
philosophiques, we infer that Voltaire’s own epistemology in the 1730s is closer
to Locke’s than Newton’s. Like Locke, Voltaire insists that some secrets
concerning the universe must remain forever beyond the grasp of mere humans,
and so known only to God. Below, I will focus on Letters XIII–XV to show
how Voltaire uses Locke and Newton to make his case in the manner I have just
described.
Letter XIII: Voltaire on Locke
Towards the beginning of Letter XIII, Voltaire offers the following summary of
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding:
Locke, apre`s avoir ruine´ les ide´es inne´es, apre`s avoir bien renonce´ a` la vanite´
de croire qu’on pense toujours, e´tablit que toutes nos ide´es nous viennent par
les sens, examine nos ide´es simples et celles qui son compose´es, suit l’esprit
de l’homme dans toutes ses ope´rations, fait voir combien les langues que les
hommes parlent sont imparfaites, et quel abus nous faisons des termes a` tous
moments. Il vient enfin a` conside´rer l’e´tendue ou plutoˆt le ne´ant des
connaissances humaines. C’est dans ce chapitre qu’il ose avancer modeste-
ment ces paroles: ‘Nous ne serons jamais peut-eˆtre capables de connnaıˆtre si
un eˆtre purement mate´riel pense ou non.’ (1961: 39)
This summary will be especially important for Voltaire’s discussion, in Letters XIV
and XV, of whether motion is better explained by impulsion (the Cartesian view) or
1 Tornelli does not propose to re-affirm the founding role of such thinkers; rather, he explores their
significance for ‘the self-conscious and manifest attitude of the Anglo-French Enlightenment towards the
past’, in a period when philosophy ‘partially becomes the servant of science’ (221; 243).
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attraction (the Newtonian view). Two themes picked out by Voltaire in the passage
quoted will prove especially relevant: first, Locke’s analysis of various abuses of
language; second, Locke’s insistence on the existence of fixed, indeed divinely
ordained limits to the progress of natural philosophy. As a prelude to seeing how
Voltaire uses these ideas, let us refer back to the relevant passages within An Essay
concerning Human Understanding.
When Voltaire writes that Locke ‘fait voir combien les langues que les hommes
parlent sont imparfaites, et quel abus nous faisons des termes a` tous moments’
(1961: 39), he clearly alludes to Locke’s chapter ‘Of the Abuse of Words’ (Locke
2004: 437–452). Here, Locke asserts that, strictly speaking, words do not stand for
‘things themselves’, but are ‘the signs of our ideas only’ (2004: 444). But ‘men
would not be thought to talk barely of their own imagination, but of things as
really they are’; and so ‘they often suppose the words to stand also for the reality
of things’ (2004: 365). Locke is suggesting that we should avoid naı¨ve
assumptions that our words refer directly and reliably to the real essence of
things in the world. Matters are not helped by the fact that words can and are
often learned in the first instance, especially by children, as mere sounds, without
being linked to ideas. If this is not remedied in later life, then ‘some, not only
children, but men, speak several words, no otherwise than parrots do’ (2004: 36).
Locke’s common-sense recommendation is to establish ‘a constant connexion
between the sound and the idea; and a designation, that the one stand for the
other: without which application of them, they are nothing but so much
insignificant noise’ (2004: 366).
So much for the abuse of language. Now let us move on to the second Lockean
theme which Voltaire will echo in the Letters on Newton: the theme of
philosophical ‘modesty’, connected with Locke’s conviction that our knowledge
of the real essence of things is and must remain partial and approximate. We have
seen that Voltaire writes, towards the end of his summary, ‘C’est dans ce chapitre
[que Locke] ose avancer modestement ces paroles: ‘‘Nous ne serons jamais peut-
eˆtre capables de connnaıˆtre si un eˆtre purement mate´riel pense ou non’’’ (Voltaire
1961: 39). The adverb ‘modestement’ is heavy with philosophical implications,
which begin to emerge if we follow Voltaire’s reference to its source. The phrase
‘l’e´tendue ou plutoˆt le ne´ant des connaissances humaines’ clearly alludes to Locke’s
chapter ‘Of the Extent of Human Knowledge’ (Locke 2004: 478–498). There we
find the statement which (as we have seen) Voltaire describes as ‘modest’: ‘We have
ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any
mere material being thinks or no’ (Locke 2004: 480).2 Read in context, Locke’s
statement concerning the ‘thinking matter’ thesis can be seen to form part of the
general case he makes that there are permanent, fixed limits to human knowledge. In
these particular lines, Locke prudently softens his statement concerning the soul by
using the word ‘possibly’; elsewhere, however, he asserts without a trace of nuance
that there are many things about the universe that we cannot know, be it now or—
2 In Letters Concerning the English Nation, Locke’s words are given as follows: ‘We shall, perhaps,
never be capable of knowing, whether a Being, purely material, thinks or not’ (Voltaire 2009: 57).
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vitally—at any point in the future.3 Furthermore, Locke asserts that God has ensured
that this is the case (2004: 275).
In order to understand Locke’s claim in context, it will be useful to recall the
importance of the distinction (familiar to corpuscularian thinkers) between primary
and secondary qualities of ‘bodies’ or, as Locke also calls them, ‘things
themselves’. The chapter ‘On the Extent of Human Knowledge’ to which Voltaire
alludes emphasizes with particular force that there is an absolute limit to what we
can ever know of primary qualities; and for Locke this, in turn, limits our knowledge
of the universe as such. But it is important to note that the same theme is woven
through all four books of the Essay. Locke most often uses gold to illustrate this
idea. Children and the vulgar, he contends, think of the colour yellow as belonging
to gold, or somehow part of the (real) essence of the thing gold. But for Locke,
colours are secondary, not primary qualities. Primary qualities are those of which
we can be certain that they belong to things, and for Locke they are extremely
limited in number: ‘Thus I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think
we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure,
motion, or rest, and number’ (2004: 135). These qualities give rise to human
perceptions of secondary qualities such as colour. Philosophers should take care not
to confuse the two: ‘Yellowness is not actually in gold; but is a power in gold to
produce that idea in us by our eyes, when placed in a due light’ (2004: 273). Locke
characterises his resignation to the idea of epistemological limits as a kind of
natural-philosophical ‘modesty’: ‘I think not only that it becomes the modesty of
philosophy not to pronounce magisterially, where we want that evidence that can
produce knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us to discern how far our knowledge
does reach’ (Locke 2004: 481).4 But modesty of the philosophical kind is surely in
the eye of the beholder; Locke’s own takes the form of an absolute, seemingly
prescient (and arguably dogmatic) insistence that there is a line in natural
philosophy that will never be crossed. Note, in the following passage, his
uncompromising use of ‘incurable’ and ‘[not] discoverable’:
Besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible parts of
bodies, on which depend all their secondary qualities, there is yet another and
more incurable part of ignorance […]; and that is, that there is no discoverable
connexion between any secondary quality, and those primary qualities that it
depends on. (Locke 2004: 484)
But whilst insisting on such limits, Locke also has a consolation to offer, and it is a
metaphysical one. Such knowledge of bodies as may be had from the senses and
disciplined reflection is reliable and sufficient to human needs; for ‘though we
3 I write ‘prudently’ because to question the immateriality of the soul was still a radical and potentially
dangerous move in Locke’s time. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, given free reign, he might have
omitted the word ‘possibly’ in the quotation above, not in order to embrace materialism, but simply to
assert, without qualification, that we do not know, and never can discover, the nature of the soul.
4 Philosophical modesty becomes a leitmotif in Voltaire’s writing. For instance, in the Traite´ de
me´taphysique of 1737, he will state as a general principle (a` propos of speculations concerning the soul):
‘Je n’avance pas davantage dans ces te´ne`bres; je m’arreˆte ou` la lumie`re de mon flambeau me manque:
c’est assez pour moi que je voie jusqu’ou` je peux aller’ (Voltaire 1961: 186).
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cannot, by the faculties we have, attain to a perfect knowledge of things; yet they
will serve us well enough for those ends above-mentioned [our business in this life,
and how we will be judged by God], which are our great concernment. (2004: 275).5
Here, the words ‘we cannot, by the faculties we have’ rule out significant future
progress in natural philosophy. Even with the aid of microscopes or telescopes, it
seems, we will never cross the divinely ordained limit that keeps us at a distance
from the real essence of material things. But that limit also keeps us safe. Imagining
what would happen if any given man’s eyes were ‘1000, or 100,000 times more
acute than it is now by the best microscope’, Locke speculates ‘he could not endure
bright sunshine, or so much as open daylight’; and certainly he would encounter
problems ‘if he could not see things he was to avoid, at a convenient distance’
(2004: 274). If we had eyes to see microscopically, we might penetrate, through our
super-sight, to the real essence of bodies, but would then doubtless fall into a hole or
be run over by a carriage—a case of seeing certain things as they really are, but also
of not seeing the wood for the trees. If we now return to Lettres philosophiques, we
can see that when Voltaire portrays Locke as a modest philosopher, he alludes, as
does Locke himself, to the role which the notion of permanent, insuperable limits to
human knowledge plays within his epistemology.6 Letter XIII opens with an
extended comparison between Locke and a list of famous predecessors, from
Anaxagoras via Plato to the Scholastics and Descartes (Voltaire 1961: 37–38).
Voltaire writes that whilst ‘Tant de raisonneurs avaient fait le roman de l’aˆme, un
sage [=Locke] est venu qui en a fait modestement l’histoire’ (1961: 38; emphasis
added). Locke’s agnosticism concerning the soul’s immateriality is used by
Voltaire, as we saw above, to illustrate the ‘modesty’ of the English thinker’s
approach. But at the most general level, the philosophical ‘modesty’ which the
philosophe praises in Locke consists in the assertion that human knowledge of the
universe, now and forever, can extend (to so speak) ‘thus far and no further’, and
that this is for the good of humanity.
A Frenchman Arriving in London
By recalling Locke’s epistemology immediately before embarking on his discussion
of Newton, Voltaire implicitly offers that epistemology as a frame for what follows.
Locke’s views may, then, be uppermost in our minds as we read the opening of
Letter XIV:
5 The idea of sufficiently reliable knowledge of bodies is linked to Locke’s distinction between degrees
of knowledge. ‘Intuitive’, ‘demonstrative’, and ‘sensitive’ knowledge are all possible; but sensitive
knowledge, whilst sufficient for our earthly existence, leaves us confronted with a gap between the
nominal and real essences of things (with real essences remaining beyond our reach). This is discussed
throughout Book IV, where the degrees of knowledge are named in Chapter II (2004: 471–478).
6 Voltaire was not alone in recommending Lockean ‘modesty’ during this period. Heilbron indicates a
‘general line’ of anti-Cartesian argument, ‘called ‘‘modest’’ by its friends and ‘‘pyrrhonistic’’ by its
enemies’ (1982: 49). Heilbron links this trend to the following ‘Lockean element’: ‘[our ideas] at best
correspond to, but do not reach, the ultimate nature of things, in particular we have no notion of the
essence of matter’ (1982: 48).
Voltaire, Newton, and Locke 19
123
Un Franc¸ais qui arrive a` Londres trouve les choses bien change´es en
philosophie comme dans tout le reste. Il a laisse´ le monde plein; il le trouve
vide. A` Paris, on voit l’univers compose´ de tourbillons de matie`re subtile; a`
Londres, on ne voit rien de cela. Chez nous, c’est la pression de la lune qui
cause le flux de la mer; chez les Anglais, c’est la mer qui gravite vers la lune.
(Voltaire 1961: 54)
Voltaire skilfully alternates Cartesian and Newtonian vocabulary here. Cartesians
argued there could be no empty space in the universe, whilst Newtonians did not;
Cartesians argued that the planets were pushed or ‘impelled’ around their orbits by
vortices of subtle matter, which Newtonians denied; and so on.
J.B. Shank comments that this passage ‘clarifies the Newtonian/Cartesian debate’
(2008: 316). However, many readers may find themselves confused, and this may
happen precisely because of Voltaire’s careful use of natural-philosophical terms.
Voltaire’s Frenchman finds ‘les choses’ changed, it seems, in two distinct but
complementary domains: ‘la philosophie’ on the one hand, and ‘tout le reste’ on the
other. ‘La Philosophie’ is clearly to be understood as natural philosophy.7 But what
is ‘tout le reste’? The most logical answer, I contend, is: things in themselves (the
objects of natural philosophy). So far, so good. But now Voltaire proceeds to
provide us with examples of ‘choses change´es’ observed by his Frenchman: a
plenum here, a vacuum there; vortices here, no vortices there; and so on. And it is
not clear which changed thing belongs to which category. The blank statement ‘Il a
laisse´ le monde plein; il le trouve vide’ makes no distinction between the idea of a
plenum and an actual plenum, the idea of a vacuum and an actual vacuum.8 Two
assertions thus jostle with each other to occupy the same sentence. The first
assertion is simply that the Frenchman hears Cartesian views expressed here,
Newtonian views there. The second assertion is that the Frenchman discovers the
Universe to be, in point of fact, a plenum here but a vacuum there. This latter
assertion makes no sense (the universe, being one, cannot differ from itself). But the
comical effect of the passage surely depends on the fact that both assertions are in
play: if we remove the words ‘et tout le reste’, all humour evaporates, along with
Voltaire’s carefully crafted ambiguity. To put this another way: if we smile, it is
because we feel ourselves, along with Voltaire’s travelling Frenchman, entering a
realm where words, ideas and things become hopelessly indistinct; and this is the
case, it is not in spite but on account of Voltaire’s use of natural-philosophical
terms.9
At this point, in case we have failed to remember Locke, Voltaire reminds us that
his Essay is relevant to the debate: ‘L’essence meˆme des choses a totalement change´
7 The Dictionnaire of the Acade´mie franc¸aise gives the following, primary definition, in all editions from
1694 to 1798: ‘Science qui consiste a` connaıˆtre les choses par leurs causes et par leurs effets.’ The
equivalent term ‘philosophie naturelle’ also exists in the period.
8 Similarly, the statement ‘A` Paris, on voit l’univers compose´ de tourbillons de matie`re subtile; a`
Londres, on ne voit rien de cela’ does not inform the reader whether ‘seeing’ is performed by the faculty
of understanding, or by the eyes (which might supposedly observe the effects of vortices).
9 To suggest more precise explanations of ‘tout le reste’ (such as manners and customs, the treatment of
smallpox) is simply to devise narrower classes of ‘things’, or phenomena, to be analysed. There is no
escape from Voltaire’s carefully constructed muddle.
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[…]. Descartes assure que l’aˆme est la meˆme chose que la pense´e, et Locke lui
prouve assez bien le contraire’ (1961: 54). This fresh allusion to Locke (where we
might expect Newton) suggests that exposure to his epistemology would do the
Cartesians good; after all, Locke proves his point ‘assez bien’. But the allusion also
reminds us of Locke’s analysis of language and its abuses. The latter point seems
particularly pertinent; for we have seen that the first paragraph of Letter XIV
exemplifies how muddled we become if we fail to use words in such a manner as to
distinguish ideas of things from things themselves. Read through a Lockean lens, it
seems that the Cartesians and Newtonians who so bemuse ‘a Frenchman arriving in
London’ may not use words any more meaningfully than parrots, as one side calls
out ‘impulsion’ and the other ‘attraction’.10 For who can say which side, if either,
does anything other than produce, to use Locke’s term once again, ‘insignificant
noise’?
Fontenelle’s Eulogy of Newton
Voltaire abandons his bemused Frenchman after the first page of Letter XIV. In the
remainder of Letters XIV and XV, he devotes himself to showing how the
seemingly hopeless stand-off between Cartesians and Newtonians might be resolved
if all accept to follow Locke’s guidance in key respects. Voltaire begins this task by
evoking the reaction of British readers to Fontenelle’s Eloge de M. Neuton (1728)
and its English translation (1729):
On attendait en Angleterre le jugement de M. de Fontenelle comme une
de´claration solennelle de la supe´riorite´ de la philosophie anglaise; mais quand
on a vu qu’il comparait Descartes a` Newton, toute la Socie´te´ royale de
Londres s’est souleve´e. Plusieurs meˆme (et ceux-la` ne sont pas les plus
philosophes) ont e´te´ choque´s de cette comparaison seulement parce que
Descartes e´tait franc¸ais. (1961: 55)11
Voltaire here derides all (English) readers who judge Fontenelle’s Eulogy according
to national bias. But this does not amount to a defence of Fontenelle’s Eulogy.
Indeed, Voltaire proceeds to offer a critique of Fontenelle to the effect that, like the
vulgar, the Academician reacts with a (non-reflecting) French-Cartesian bias to the
word ‘attraction’, and that this prevents him from affording Newton’s discoveries a
fair hearing.
Voltaire prepares this critique of Fontenelle as follows. First, he remarks that
Newton himself feared the word ‘attraction’ might mislead his readers: ‘Newton
avait bien pre´vu, apre`s avoir de´montre´ l’existence de ce principe, qu’on se
10 Incidentally, by contrast with humans who speak ‘no otherwise than parrots’, Locke mentions the
anecdote, recorded by Sir William Temple, of a ‘rational parrot’ who, it was claimed, conversed
intelligently with a Prince of Orange in Brazil (2004: 300–302).
11 Fontenelle, who became permanent secretary to the Acade´mie des sciences in 1697, invented and
assumed the role of writing eulogies for deceased members. (Newton had been appointed a member in
1699.) Shank argues that Fontenelle used the E´loges ‘to exert a decisive role in shaping the public
discourse of science in France and throughout the Republic of Letters’ (Shank 2008: 61).
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re´volterait contre ce seul nom [attraction]’. Voltaire no doubt expects his readers to
know that the word in question reminded Newton’s contemporaries of the ‘occult
qualities’ of Aristotelian physics.12 To avoid this, he explains, ‘[Newton]
pre´cautionne le lecteur meˆme, il l’avertit de ne la pas confondre avec les qualite´s
occultes des anciens, et de se contenter de connaıˆtre qu’il y a dans tous les corps une
force centrale qui agit d’un bout de l’univers a` l’autre […] suivant les lois
immuables de la me´canique’ (1961: 64–65). It seems, however, that Newton hoped
too much of his early readers—including even Fontenelle. For along with Saurin,
the great Academician (long disposed to Cartesian physics) turns a deaf ear to
Newton’s plea not to confuse ‘attraction’ with occult qualities:
Il est e´tonnant, qu’apre`s les protestations solennelles de ce grand philosophe,
M. Saurin et M. de Fontenelle, qui eux-meˆmes me´ritent ce nom [de grand
philosophe], lui aient reproche´ nettement les chime`res du pe´ripate´tisme: M.
Saurin dans les me´moires de l’Acade´mie de 1709, et M. de Fontenelle dans
l’e´loge meˆme de M. Newton. (1961: 65)
Consequently, as he is distracted by a word (‘attraction’) that reminds him of the
peripatetics, Fontenelle fails to engage with Newton’s ideas as such. It would seem
that even Academicians sometimes fail to remember that words are ‘signs of ideas
only’, and so speak, it might seem, ‘no otherwise than parrots’.
The reader can decide to take, or not to take, Voltaire’s argument on trust. But in
case we are curious to assess the matter first hand, we can follow up Voltaire’s
stated sources: the 1709 Me´moires of the Acade´mie for Saurin, and the E´loge de
Neuton for Fontenelle. Here it is appropriate to focus on Fontenelle rather than
Saurin. In the E´loge, then, we find the following passage:
M. Neuton pose touˆjours l’action de la Pesanteur re´ciproque dans tous les
Corps, et proportionnelle seulement a` leurs masses, et par-la` il semble
de´terminer la Pesanteur a` eˆtre re´ellement une attraction. Il n’emploie a` chaque
moment que ce mot pour exprimer la force active des Corps, force, a` la ve´rite´,
inconnue¨, et qu’il ne pre´tend pas de´finir, mais si elle pouvait agir aussi par
impulsion, pourquoi ce terme plus clair n’aurait-il pas e´te´ pre´fe´re´? (Fontenelle
1728: 17)
In this extract, where Fontenelle is preoccupied by Newton’s choice of word, he
seems to miss the point that if Newton had used ‘impulsion’, he would implicitly
have subscribed to Cartesian vortices and the plenum.13
Elsewhere in the Eulogy, Fontenelle persists in linking Newtonian attraction to
occult qualities simply on the grounds that Newton uses the word ‘attraction’:
12 Aristotelians were capable of asserting that amber attracts straw, or the lodestone iron, because
mysterious affinities exist between those pairs of things. As occult qualities were capable of being named
but not analysed, they were discredited in the eyes of seventeenth-century adherents of the new
mechanical physics, who saw that they gave rise to circular arguments (Heilbron 1982: 11–22). For
detailed background, see Grant (1981) and Hamou (2002).
13 Fontenelle’s question ‘why not use the term ‘‘impulsion’’?’ seems utterly disingenuous. For only
several pages further on, he notes that Newton uses the phenomenon of resistance in order to argue
against vortices—and therefore against ‘impulsion’ in the Cartesian sense (1728: 21–22).
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‘L’Attraction et le Vuide, bannis de la Phisique par Descartes, et bannis pour jamais
selon les apparences, y reviennent ramene´s par M. Neuton, arme´s d’une force toute
nouvelle dont on ne les croyoit pas capables, et seulement peut-eˆtre un peu
de´guise´s’ (Fontenelle 1728: 23). The phrase ‘seulement peut-eˆtre un peu de´guise´s’
suggests, somewhat sarcastically, an enduring link between Newton and Aristotelian
scholasticism, and so serves as the ‘sting in the tail’ of Fontenelle’s sentence. In
Letter XV Voltaire recognizably reproduces Fontenelle’s wording, but having
removed the sting. What Fontenelle had intended sarcastically thus becomes
laudatory: ‘Enfin, pour mieux trancher encore, s’il est possible, toute difficulte´,
[Newton] prouve ou du moins rend fort probable, et meˆme par des expe´riences, que
le plein est impossible, et il nous rame`ne le vide, qu’Aristote et Descartes avaient
banni du monde’ (1961: 60). Similarly, Fontenelle’s question, cited above,
‘pourquoi ce terme plus clair [impulsion] n’aurait-il pas e´te´ pre´fe´re´?’, is
incorporated into Letter XV in the most telling of ways: ‘Presque tous les Franc¸ais,
savants et autres, ont re´pe´te´ ce reproche. On entend dire partout: ‘‘Pourquoi Newton
ne s’est-il pas servi du mot d’impulsion, que l’on comprend si bien, plutoˆt que du
terme d’attraction, que l’on ne comprend pas?’’’ (1961: 65). In Voltaire’s version,
Fontenelle’s original question is repeated unreflectingly by one and all; and there is
no apparent distinction between the ‘savants’ (who move in the same circles as
Saurin and Fontenelle) and the ‘autres’. We might say, in brief, that in both passages
Voltaire rewrites Fontenelle in such as manner as to render him the arroseur arrose´.
In the second half of Letter XV, Voltaire invents a series of speeches showing
how Newton might have answered a Fontenelle or a Saurin. Thus, Newton ‘aurait
pu re´pondre a` ces critiques: […] ‘‘J’ai de´couvert une nouvelle proprie´te´ de la
matie`re, un des secrets du Cre´ateur, j’en ai calcule´, j’en ai de´montre´ les effets: peut-
on me chicaner sur le nom que je lui donne?’’’ (1961: 65–66). The fact, emphasized
by Voltaire, that Newton is attacked on account of a word (‘le nom’) rather than an
idea suggests, once again, that Cartesians (including Fontenelle) fall into an abuse of
language. Voltaire-Newton continues his defence by reasserting that, whatever word
is used for it, attraction is ‘une chose re´elle’, for the reason that ‘on en de´montre les
effets et qu’on en calcule les proportions’ (1961: 66). (Thus, beyond any wrangles
over words, Newton has experimental philosophy and mathematics on his side.) By
extension, claims Voltaire-Newton, Cartesian vortices could justifiably be named
‘une qualite´ occulte’, for ‘on n’a jamais prouve´ leur existence’ (1961: 66). The
whole of this argument has been given support in advance by Voltaire’s appeal to
Locke in Letter XIII. Seen through that frame, strict attention is to be paid to words
and their relation (or non-relation) to ideas on the one hand and things (phenomena
and bodies) on the other. As Voltaire-Newton speaks towards the end of Letter XV,
the obscurity created by the opening of Letter XIV is finally dispelled, and the result
is entirely to Newton’s advantage.14
14 In an irony that may have been intended by Voltaire but is more probably accidental, Fontenelle
himself insists on the importance of distinguishing words from things in natural philosophy. Heilbron
refers to a passage where he praises Du Hamel’s veiled disapproval of the Scholastics’ using ‘des mots,
qui n’ont point d’autre me´rite que d’avoir longtemps passe´ pour des choses’ (Heilbron 1982: 17).
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Newton and Lockean Modesty
Voltaire-Newton’s final words in Chapter XV are: ‘La cause de cette cause est dans
le sein de Dieu’ (Voltaire 1961: 66), where ‘cette cause’ refers to attraction. The
metaphor of God’s bosom suggests that an absolute limit has been reached: the
reality of attraction has been proven by its effects, both empirically and
mathematically, but God conceals the actual cause, now and forever. We will
never know, for instance, if attraction, as a cause, is the effect of a material cause
beyond itself, or if it results from God’s direct action in the universe. It seems, then,
that Newton (as ‘voiced’ by Voltaire) subscribes to Locke’s notion of philosophical
modesty: ‘thus far and no further’. That such modesty is a kind of wisdom is
suggested by the Latin tag which Voltaire adds to close Chapter XV: ‘Procedes huc,
et non ibis amplius’.15 But now it is not Locke’s but God’s voice we hear, or rather
an echo of God’s address to Job in the Latin of the Vulgate: ‘et dixi: Usque huc
venies et non procedes amplius; et hic confringes tumentes fluctus tuos.’16 In
Christian tradition Job, of course, is a figure of virtue made to suffer and doubt in a
contest between God and Satan; terrible trials are visited on Job, but his enduring
piety is rewarded in the end. The Book of Job may be read as a meditation on
Providence, but also on the bounds which God has set to human understanding. By
using this allusion as a coda to Newton’s imagined speech on the impossibility of
knowing the ‘cause of the cause’, Voltaire underlines the idea of a limit to all human
knowledge: when it comes to understanding the world and of its Creator, humanity
can advance ‘thus far and no further’.17 By the same token, ‘Procedes huc…’
reminds the reader, no doubt, of Locke’s philosophical modesty which Voltaire had
exposed (as we saw above) in Letter XIII.18
Now, though Newton may pay lip service to modesty in the Lockean style, he
does not in fact share his notion of limits or the epistemology which it entails. In
Newton on the Continent, Henry Guerlac discusses a Latin slogan which the future
author of the Principia wrote at the head of the notebook he entitled ‘Philosophical
15 On the subject of Newton’s modesty, it has been reported that he said, towards the end of his life: ‘I
know not what I may seem to the world, but as to myself, I seem to have been only like a boy playing on
the sea-shore and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than
ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.’ However, Simon Schaffer
throws doubt on the veracity of this ‘obiter dictum’ as well as (implicitly) on the notion of a modest
Newton (Schaffer 2009: 243).
16 Job 38, v. 11. In the Authorized Version, the passage is given as follows: ‘And said, Hitherto shalt thou
come, but no further: and here shall thy proud waves be stayed?’ In context, ‘And said’ is clearly to be
read as ‘And [where wast thou when] I said […]?’, where ‘thou’ is Job. In other words, God asks Job
rhetorically where he was at the moment of creation, or more precisely at the moment when God ‘shut up
the sea with doors’ (38.8) and addressed it with the words: ‘Hitherto shalt thou come [etc.]’.
17 In Letters concerning the English Nation, the quotation from Job is given as ‘Procedes huc, & non
amplius’, and is followed by an English translation: ‘Hither thou shalt go, and no farther’ (Voltaire 2009:
75). Incidentally, I take it as read that Voltaire is writing in a deistic vein throughout.
18 In another context, it would be interesting to consider Locke’s epistemology of limits in relation to the
‘corpuscular’ hypothesis mentioned favourably in Book IV of the Essay (Locke 486). The question of
how far the small number of primary qualities posited by corpuscularian natural philosophers (Heilbron
1982: 22–35) supports Locke’s epistemological limits is a thorny one, however, and remains beyond the
scope of the present article.
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Questions’: ‘Amicus Plato amicus Aristoteles magis amica veritas’ (1981: 17–28).
As Guerlac shows, this slogan suggests that with each generation, human knowledge
should progress in spite of deference to illustrious forebears; this in turn suggests
that it need never find a limit short of the perfection of all knowledge.19 It is
admittedly the case that, for a range of reasons that do not need to be stated here,
Newton had to present his radically new ideas as no threat to mainstream religion,
which more readily accommodated some discoveries than others.20 But precisely for
that reason we should arm ourselves with caution when Newton sounds
epistemologically modest. To take a well-known example, we can refer to the
General Scholium which Newton added to the Principia in 1713. Towards the
beginning of that text he presents his discoveries as providing support to the
conventional proof of God from design:
This most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets and Comets, could only
proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being.
[…] And lest the systems of the fixed Stars should, by their gravity, fall on
each other mutually, he hath placed those Systems at immense distances one
from another. (Newton 1957: 208)21
We also find a nod in the direction of Locke and others (especially corpuscularians)
who insist that the primary qualities of things are forever hidden from human
inquiry: ‘In bodies we see only their figures and colours, we hear only the sounds,
we touch only their outward surfaces, we smell only the smells and taste the savors,
but their inward substances are not to be known either by our senses or by any reflex
act of our minds’ (Newton 1957: 210). Finally, that Newton knows his limits is
suggested by his statement ‘I frame no hypotheses’ (‘hypotheses non fingo’),
meaning that whilst he has demonstrated the principle of attraction, he will not
recklessly guess at its cause (1957: 210).
However, such professions of modesty surely perform a specific rhetorical
function, which is to mitigate the bolder statements contained in the General
Scholium. These include a passage where Newton describes God’s relation, not only
to living creatures but also to space, time and ‘all things’:
God is the same God, always and everywhere. He is omnipresent, not virtually
only, but also substantially; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In him
are all things contained and moved; yet neither affects the other: God suffers
nothing from the motion of bodies; bodies find no resistance from the
omnipresence of God. It is allowed by all that the supreme God exists
19 Guerlac further suggests, following Richard S. Westfall, that Newton’s source for his version of the
slogan (with its significant mention of Aristotle) was ‘English physician, natural philosopher, and original
Fellow of the Royal Society, Walter Charleton (1620–1707)’ (1981: 26–27).
20 For a nuanced account of this topic, see Hedley Brooke’s ground-breaking study (1991). Voltaire was
obviously aware of Newton’s caution; later in the 1730s, for instance, he remarks of a famous passage in
the Opticks (concerning God’s being ‘in’ space): ‘[Newton] a craint les disputes’ (Voltaire 1830: 35).
21 The General Scholium, as printed in this volume, corresponds to Andrew Motte’s (1729) translation of
the original Latin text.
Voltaire, Newton, and Locke 25
123
necessarily; and by the same necessity he exists always and everywhere.
(Newton 1957: 209)
Aware that his treatment of God conflates what others strive to separate (i.e. physics
and metaphysics), Newton adds: ‘And thus much concerning God; to discourse of
whom from the appearances of things, does certainly belong to natural philosophy’
(1957: 209). Indeed, Edward Grant argues that, by the time Newton finished the
Principia he had come to believe in God as ‘an incorporeal aether ‘‘who could move
bodies without offering resistance to them in turn,’’ as the General Scholium would
declare’.22 More recently, though on different grounds, Philippe Hamou also
suggests that Newton had effectively, but discreetly, made God an object of natural
philosophy.23 As for the famous ‘hypotheses non fingo’, Hamou shows that it is to
be understood as a claim to be observing the post-Baconian methods of natural-
philosophical inquiry approved by a number of thinkers including Boyle (2002:
144). And if we remain in doubt as to whether Newton defies Locke’s limits
concerning what is discoverable by the human mind, we can note, finally, that he
writes ‘hitherto’ and ‘not yet’ into his closing summation in the General Scholium:
‘Hitherto we have explain’d the phænomena of the heavens and of our sea, by the
power of Gravity, but have not yet assign’d the cause of this power’, before raising
the hypothesis of a ‘certain most subtle spirit, which pervades and lies hid in all
gross bodies’.
The boldness of such lines within the General Scholium belies the ‘philosophical
modesty’ implied by earlier passages. Nor do we need to venture far into the main
body of the Principia to find Newton transgressing Locke’s notion of limits. Whilst
Locke insists that ‘sensible knowledge’, by its nature, poses an obstacle that cannot
be removed to our knowledge of things themselves, Newton writes: ‘Sic vice
locorum & motuum absolutorum relativis utimur; nec incommode in rebus humanis:
in philosophicis autem abstrahendum est a sensibus’ (1687: 7). The passage is
extended slightly in Andrew Motte’s 1729 translation:
And so instead of absolute places and motions, we use relative ones; and that
without any inconvenience in common affairs: but in philosophical disqui-
sitions, we ought to abstract from our senses, and consider things themselves,
distinct from what are only sensible measures of them.24
‘Abstracting from our senses’ leads, in Newton but emphatically not in Locke, to
understanding ‘things themselves’, i.e. the bodies of the universe and (in this
passage) their relation to space. Even these few extracts from Newton suggest that,
22 Grant argues that Newton’s private and public writing show his belief that ‘God is omnipresent [in
infinite space] because He is actually a three-dimensional, extended being. […] Newton had even made
God’s literal omnipresence the foundation of his physics, the basis for the maintenance of its
mathematical laws and therefore of lawful cosmic operation’ (1981: 254).
23 Citing the Opticks and the Principia to show that Newton’s inductive epistemology, precisely,
envisaged a step-by-step progress from cause to effect as far as the (divine) ‘first cause’, Hamou
concludes: ‘Au regard de cette ‘‘analyse’’ inductive, les espoirs de Newton sont donc immenses, puisqu’il
semble qu’elle doive conduire a` terme a` une forme de the´isme experimental’ (2002: 146).
24 This passage is cited and discussed in Iliffe (2007: 94).
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when Voltaire associates him with philosophical modesty a` la Locke, then, he
misleads the reader.
Conclusion
Overall, I have argued that Voltaire effectively grafts Locke’s epistemology of
limits onto Newton’s own, more ambitious epistemology. This is significant because
Voltaire knew his subject too well not to be aware of the difference between
Newton’s and Locke’s tendencies. It is en connaissance de cause, then, that Voltaire
contains Newton within Locke’s epistemological limits. It should be noted that there
are surely differences, too, between Voltaire and Locke. But on the subject of what
can be discovered by the human mind, Voltaire was far closer to Locke than
Newton. Perhaps we might say, with all due caution, that epistemological limits
apply, for Voltaire, not to ‘things themselves’ but to things in so far as they are
related to God. The last lines of the E´le´ments de la Philosophie de Newton express
Voltaire’s own position. Commenting that we remain ‘au bord d’un oce´an immense’
(might we think once again of Job here), Voltaire exclaims: ‘Que de choses restent a`
de´couvrir! mais aussi que de choses sont a` jamais hors de la sphe`re de nos
connaissances!’.25 His emphasis is firmly on the permanence of certain limits,
expressed by ‘a` jamais’. And this position, reminiscent of Locke, is already
expressed in Lettres philosophiques, in the tag ‘Procedes huc et non amplius’.
By the 1750 s Newtonian physics had won the day.26 It is perhaps on account of
this that in a new, 1756 edition of Lettres philosophiques Voltaire no longer
conceals his disapproval of the metaphysical (as opposed to the physico-
mathematical) aspects of Newton’s Principia:
Bien des gens, en lisant le peu de me´taphysique que Newton a mis a` la fin de
ses Principes mathe´matiques, y ont trouve´ quelque chose d’aussi obscur que
l’Apocalypse. Les me´taphysiciens et les the´ologiens ressemblent assez a` cette
espe`ce de gladiateurs qu’on faisait combattre les yeux couverts d’un bandeau.
Mais quand Newton travailla les yeux ouverts a` ses mathe´matiques, sa vue
porta aux bornes du monde. (Voltaire 1961: 79)27
When Voltaire refers to ‘le peu de me´taphysique’ which Newton had placed ‘a` la fin
de ses Principes mathe´matiques’, he can only mean parts of the General Scholium.
Voltaire, we can infer, is wary of passages in the Scholium such as the one we have
already cited: ‘God is the same God, always and everywhere. He is omnipresent, not
25 E´le´ments de la Philosophie de Newton, p. 234.
26 In the (1751) ‘Discours pre´liminaire’ of the Encyclope´die, D’Alembert confidently declares of
Newton: ‘Sa the´orie du monde (car je ne veux pas dire son syste`me) est aujourd’hui si ge´ne´ralement
rec¸ue, qu’on commence a` disputer a` l’auteur l’honneur de l’invention’ (1751: xxvi–xxvii).
27 Locke, by contrast, had remained discreet to the end. He speaks of the ‘incomparable Mr Newton’ in
the ‘Epistle to the Reader’ that serves as a preface to his Essay: and Woolhouse notes that he uses the
same phrase in correspondence with Bishop Stillingfleet (Locke 2004: xi; 135). But textual evidence
suggests that, having read the Principia shortly before publishing his Essay, Locke was not fully
persuaded.
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virtually only, but also substantially; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In
him are all things contained and moved; yet neither affects the other’ (Newton 1957:
209). This is to speculate about God’s relation to space and time, and His relation to
matter. It is this tendency in Newton that Voltaire calls ‘obscur’ (1961: 79), for it is
not based in empirical science or mathematics. To speak as though it were possible
to describe God’s relation to the universe would be to render God Himself an object
of natural philosophy. Voltaire, certainly, refused to contemplate the possibility that
even a mind such as Newton’s could reach that far. If ‘Procedes huc’ had not
existed, Voltaire would have had to invent it.
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